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Abstract
The US government has announced an initiative to promote the “rule of law” in the People’s
Republic of China. However, though China has also endorsed building the “rule of law” as a
goal, the American and Chinese views of what “rule of law” entails differ substantially. In the
US government, rule of law reform is seen as a way to promote human rights and political
reform, whereas the Chinese government wants to restrict law reform to those areas closely
related to developing a market economy. To deal with this divergence in goals, the US has
adopted a “Trojan Horse” strategy: the belief is that the Chinese will allow US-sponsored law
reform programs for economic reasons, but once established, these programs will lead to broader
political reform. However, this view is not well-supported by theory or empirical evidence. Thus,
while law reform programs in China may be worthwhile, we should be skeptical of their ability
to trigger more fundamental political reform.
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A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls?:
Problems and Prospects of US-Sponsored “Rule of Law” Reform Projects
in the People’s Republic of China
Matthew C. Stephenson
Introduction
Consider the following scenario.  Members of the American governmental, academic, and
nonprofit communities notice that, in an important region of the developing world, legal institutions
and substantive law appear inadequate.  Laws seem opaque, unpredictable, and unfair.  Legal
institutions are inefficient, inaccessible to ordinary people, and subject to corruption and political
interference.  These legal deficiencies, it is believed, threaten sustained and equitable economic
development, the protection of individual rights, and the possibility for greater democratic political
reform.  Thus, it seems logical to these American observers that the United States, with its
sophisticated laws and legal institutions, and its years of experience developing a legal system, could
provide useful expertise and assistance in promoting legal reform and development in this region.
The region in question is Latin America (and to a lesser extent Africa and Southeast Asia),
and the time is the mid-1960s.  US legal assistance efforts in these countries – which came to be
known as the Law and Development Movement – began with great optimism.
1  Yet the movement
came to a virtual halt only a decade later, after a crisis of disillusionment not only with the specific
projects, but with the whole vision of legal development which sustained them.  The definitive
critique of the Law and Development Movement came from two of its most distinguished
practitioners. In their 1974 article, “Scholars in Self-Estrangement”, David Trubek and Marc
Galanter claimed that the Law and Development Movement was based on a flawed theory of law
and society, and a flawed ideal of “liberal legalism.”
 2  In many ways their criticisms echoed the
prescient observations of Lawrence Friedman, who noted as early as 1969 that, among other failings,
Americans who went abroad to promote legal reform in developing countries lacked any “careful,
thought out, explicit theory of law and society or law and development.”
3  A more lengthy critique
of the projects in Latin America came from a former Ford Foundation official, James Gardner, who
                                                          
1 For the classic statement of the project’s vision and spirit, see Justice William O. Douglas “Lawyers of the Peace
Corps” American Bar Association Journal 48:909-913 (1962)
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claimed that these programs, though well-intentioned, amounted to “legal imperialism”.
4  Under the
weight of such intense internal and external criticism, the Law and Development Movement
withered.  Funding dried up, programs were cancelled, and scholars turned their attention to other
issues.
5
It is important, when reflecting on the failure of the Law and Development Movement, to
keep in mind that many did not accept all of the critical arguments leveled against the enterprise.
Several leading professionals in the law and development field at the time took issue with Trubek
and Galanter, both in their theoretical approach and their conclusions.
6  More recent scholars have
pointed out that ten years was far too little time to declare such a complex endeavor a failure, and
suggest that Trubek and Galanter’s “self-estrangement” may have had more to do with a home-
grown crisis of faith in American institutions than experience in the developing world.
7
Nonetheless, it is undoubtedly true that the Law and Development Movement collapsed in the late
1970s, and that much of this collapse can be traced to the weakness of the theoretical foundations of
the enterprise.  Even if Trubek and Galanter were too hasty in concluding that the movement was
fatally flawed, the lack of a well-thought-out, cogent theory of how and why legal reform programs
were supposed to work no doubt made the movement especially vulnerable to a crisis of confidence.
Given this history, anyone following the recent US announcements of a “Rule of Law
Initiative” to help China reform its laws and legal institutions has reason for concern.  The opening
paragraph of this paper could apply to the current Rule of Law Initiative, focused on China, just as
well as it applies to the previous Law and Development Movement, focused on Latin America.
There are, of course, important differences, and I do not mean to suggest that legal reform efforts in
China are bound to meet the same fate as the first Law and Development Movement.  Nevertheless,
there are clearly parallels between the two.  Therefore, given the fact that weak theoretical
foundations contributed to the failure – or at least the termination – of the earlier movement, it is
                                                          
4 Gardner, James Legal Imperialism: American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1980) 401 pp.
5 For contemporary post-mortems of the movement, see Merryman, John H. “Comparative Law and Social Change: On
the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement” American Journal of Comparative Law
25:457-491 (1977) and Burg, Elliot M. “Law and Development: A Review of the Literature & a Critique of ‘Scholars in
Self-Estrangement” American Journal of Comparative Law 25:492-530 (1977).  For more recent reflections on the history of
the movement and its lessons, see Tamanaha, Brian Z. “The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies” American Journal
of International Law 89:470-486 (1995) and Messick, Richard E. “Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey
of the Issues” World Bank Research Observer 14(1):00-000 (1999)
6 See, for example, Seidman, Robert B. “The Lessons of Self-Estrangement: On the Methodology of Law and
Development” Research in Law and Sociology 1:1-29 (1978)
7 Tamanaha (1995)3
worth examining more closely the theoretical foundations supporting the US-China Rule of Law
Initiative.
The goal of this paper is to identify the most important elements of the theory of law and
social change implicit in the China Rule of Law Initiative and related programs, and to reflect on
those theoretical suppositions in light of the available scholarly research.  The paper has two chief
audiences.  The first is the US policy and non-governmental community engaged in China law
reform projects.  For this group, the goal of the paper is to convey some of the important insights of
scholars who have studied law and social change, and to suggest that greater attention to the theories
implicit in various policy proposals is important – even for practical (and busy) men and women of
affairs.  The second intended audience is the scholarly community interested in law and
development, and law and society more generally. For this group, the goal is to suggest, by
describing the types of implicit theory used by policy makers, the types of research that would be
particularly useful in the policy world.
Before proceeding, a few caveats and disclaimers are in order. First, the focus of this paper is
on strategy on a large scale.  This sort of paper cannot and will not try to describe and critique in
detail all the existing programs related to law reform and legal education in China.  Rather, it will
attempt to describe the vision of social and legal change that drives many of these programs.
Criticisms of this broad vision should not be taken necessarily as criticisms of specific programs.
But the broad vision and the specific projects have a clear relationship, as the history of the previous
Law and Development Movement makes clear, and rethinking the former may imply reorienting the
latter.
The focus of the paper is also on the vision articulated by the US government, though the
views of major non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are considered as well.  This focus may
seem odd, given that the US government’s activities in this area have so far been minimal.  The
government focus is due, first, to the belief that government-sponsored initiatives are especially
important in this field; second, to the belief that the government has the broadest-ranging interests
and widest constituency, and is therefore likely to have a more comprehensive vision of the goals of
legal reform than individual non-governmental programs; and third, to the fact that recent US
announcements of interest in Chinese “rule of law” are the source of much of the increased
attention to these issues.
Because there is little secondary literature on the US government and NGO China law
reform programs, much of the information in this paper comes from interviews conducted with4
people in the US Department of State, the academic community, and several major US NGOs.
However, because many of parties involved in these projects proved difficult to contact, the number
of interviewees was smaller than was originally hoped.  In the end, nine people were interviewed,
some more than once.  Interviewees generally wanted to remain confidential, and therefore they are
identified by sector (government, academe, NGO) but not by name or position.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The first section describes how “rule of law”
made it onto the Sino-US bilateral agenda.  The second section describes the objective of “rule of
law” reform as perceived by the US and the Chinese governments.  The third section describes the
US strategy for promoting its vision of the “rule of law”, and the theoretical model of law and
society that underlies this strategy.  The fourth section assesses this theory and strategy in light of
the existing academic literature, concluding that the model of legal change implicit in this strategy
may have serious problems.
I.  How “Rule of Law” Got on the Sino-US Agenda
In the last year or two, the “rule of law” has become a higher-profile issue on the US-China
governmental agenda.  Legal reform in China, however, is hardly a new issue for US academics and
NGOs.
8  The China Legal Education and Exchange Committee (CLEEC), for example, has been in
operation since 1984, funded initially by a grant from the Ford Foundation, and then with additional
assistance from the US Information Agency (USIA).
9  The Ford Foundation also sponsors
numerous other projects in this field.  The Asia Foundation has also been involved in sponsoring
legal education programs in China for close to two decades, and recently it has started to initiate
other types of legal reform projects as well.
10  The American Bar Association has also undertaken
grant-funded legal reform and education projects in China.
11  And these are only the largest and
highest-profile non-governmental organizations.  According to one source in the US State
Department who works closely with these issues, there are perhaps thousands of individuals and
NGOs doing projects in some way related to law reform in China.
12
                                                          
8 Also, numerous other governments, especially in Europe, are involved in China law reform projects.  The focus of




12 Interview (A).  My sense is that “:thousands” is an exaggeration of the number of people and organizations
conducting activities in this field, but the actual number is nonetheless very large.5
Thus, when the Clinton Administration announced its “China Rule of Law Initiative” in
1997-1998, the government was not exactly moving into uncharted territory.  It seemed, however,
that the Administration was staking out a place for greater government involvement, and attempting
to bring together diverse non-governmental activities into a common framework, conceived of as
promoting the “rule of law”.
13  (Some of the people already in the field were surprised that their
work was now considered part of the announced Rule of Law Initiative.  One academic who had
been working for some time with Chinese legal education issues commented, “I never really thought
of my work as ‘rule of law’ work, though I definitely thought of it as legal reform … I found myself
sort of roped into this ‘rule of law’ focus.”
14)  Why did the Clinton Administration suddenly start
paying so much attention (at least rhetorically) to the rule of law in China?  The answer has to do
with the politics of US China policy, especially in the field of human rights.
Since the 1989 Tienanmen Square crackdown, there has been an annual effort in the US
Congress to deny Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status to China unless it improves its human
rights record.  (Over time, the list of issues tied to MFN status expanded to include things like
nuclear and missile nonproliferation, but human rights has remained the primary focus.)  The
Clinton Administration initially supported linking MFN status to human rights, but soon changed
course when it became clear that the policy was not viable.  The threat to revoke MFN status was
not credible, given the US stake in political and economic relations with China.  Furthermore, the
linkage between MFN status and human rights, and the yearly battle over MFN renewal, created
substantial political difficulties for the Administration and was widely criticized as corrosive to the
overall Sino-American relationship.
Therefore, in 1994, the Clinton Administration – in keeping with its professed strategy of
“engagement” – declared an end to the policy of linking the continuation of MFN status with
China’s human rights performance.  Citing China’s strategic, political, and economic importance to
the United States, President Clinton declared that the policy of using MFN status to pressure China
to improve its human rights performance was unwise and unworkable.  However, it was politically
important that the President articulate a constructive human rights strategy concurrently with the
decision to de-link human rights issues and MFN status, lest the Administration be seen as
                                                          
13 This statement should not be taken as implying that the government sought a controlling role, or even that it intended
to run a lot of programs directly.  According to one of the State Department officials working directly on the Inititiative,
none of the government’s activities are intended to supplant existing NGO programs.  Rather, the idea is to help raise
the profile of issues, serve as a launching pad for new initiatives, and work through public-private partnerships.
[Interview (A).]  Nevertheless, the public rhetoric suggested a central role for US government involvement.
14 Interview (G).6
abandoning the goal of promoting human rights in China.  Therefore, Clinton announced several
instruments the United States would use to promote human rights in lieu of MFN pressure.  Among
these was “support for efforts underway in China to promote the rule of law, in particular for efforts
to achieve legal reforms aimed at specific human rights abuses.”
15
Thus, “rule of law” began to find its way onto the Sino-US agenda, at least on the US side.
According to an official at the State Department, “rule of law” was actually just one component of a
broader human rights strategy to promote “civil society” in China.  This strategy was, in turn, related
to the more general principle, sponsored by then-Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor John Shattuck, of a “two-track” human rights policy.  The first track
would consist of traditional human rights pressure – speaking out about alleged human rights
violations, sponsoring resolutions in international forums, applying diplomatic pressure, and so
forth.  The second track would emphasize supporting positive trends within countries – such as the
growth of civil society – that would lead to greater protection of human rights.  This “two-track”
strategy was re-formulated under Shattuck’s successor, Harold Koh, as an “inside/outside” human
rights policy.  The basic idea was the same; the underlying belief was that major human rights
breakthroughs would come when internal and external pressure combined.
16
However, despite Clinton’s announcement in 1994 that the US would sponsor programs to
promote civil society – and, under that rubric, the rule of law – the proposed programs ran into all
sorts of problems because of US laws that prohibit the government from dealing with “gross human
rights abusers.”  Some influential members of Congress believe that the US should not engage in any
cooperative programs with the current Chinese government, and they successfully blocked funding
for most of the initiatives the Administration proposed.  In the end, the State Department had to
retreat, settling for much more modest programs using development assistance money not covered
by the problematic laws.
17  Ultimately, the US government did little to follow up on Clinton’s 1994
declaration that the US would support efforts in China to build the rule of law.
Nonetheless, interest within the State Department and the Administration for rule of law
programs (not only in China, but throughout the world) persisted.  In late 1996, the post of “Special
Coordinator for Global Rule of Law” was created within the State Department, and Clinton brought
Paul Gewirtz, a Yale Law School professor, on board to fill the position.  Though Gewirtz’s
                                                          
15 President Clinton’s opening statement at a news conference, 26 May 1994. “U.S. Renews Most-Favored Nation Trade
Status for China” Available from White House web site.
16 Interview (B).
17 Interview (B).7
portfolio was global, he was, in the words of one outside observer, “bitten by the China bug.”
18
This same general observation was made, less colorfully, by one of Gewirtz’s colleagues in the State
Department, who estimated that he spent about 90 percent of his time working on issues related to
China.
19  According to another State Department source, Gewirtz was ultimately responsible for
getting “rule of law” more prominently on the agenda for the 1997 Clinton-Jiang summit in the US,
and for getting the two presidents to sign on to the Rule of Law Initiative.
Thus, on 29 October 1997, the Clinton-Jiang Summit Joint Statement prominently
mentioned “Cooperation in the Field of Law” as an important way the two countries could promote
their common interests.
20  In June 1998, on Clinton’s visit to Beijing, the two sides issued another
Joint Statement, this time making somewhat more specific declarations about the areas for
cooperation in the field of law.  The two sides announced their intention to cooperate in six specific
areas: judicial and lawyer training, legal protection of human rights, administrative law, legal aid for
the poor, commercial law and arbitration, and law enforcement.
21  The idea of promoting “rule of
law”, seemingly dormant since Clinton’s speech in 1994, reemerged as a high-profile item on the
Sino-US agenda.
However, although Gewirtz seems to have succeeded in getting “rule of law” back onto the
table, the so-called Rule of Law Initiative appears to be foundering on the same political obstacles
that stymied Clinton’s 1994 interest in Sino-US rule of law cooperation.  Simply put, powerful and
influential members of Congress who oppose any cooperation with China have obstructed funding
for the programs envisioned by the Initiative.  A couple of conferences under the auspices of the
Rule of Law Initiative have been held – a high level, off-the-record discussion of human rights
issues, held in the US, and a Law School Deans’ Conference, held in Beijing
22  – but there has been
little other follow-up.  Part of the explanation for this is that, shortly after the conclusion of the
second Clinton-Jiang summit in Beijing, Gewirtz left the government, and for more than six months,
the Global Rule of Law Coordinator position remained vacant.  During that time, responsibility for
the China Rule of Law Initiative was diffused to different desks in the State Department. In
February 1999, Joe Onek was appointed Global Rule of Law Coordinator, and a month later Phoebe
Yang came on board as the State Department Coordinator for China Rule of Law Programs, a new
                                                          
18 Interview (F).
19 Interview (B).
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22 Interviews (A, B).8
position.
23  However, Congressional opposition and US laws regulating the types of programs the
State Department can fund have continued to prevent additional progress.
Thus, despite the fanfare that accompanied the announcement of the Rule of Law Initiative
in 1997 and 1998, little has actually been done.  The lack of progress in the year since the Clinton-
Jiang Beijing summit has led some observers to criticize the Administration for unveiling the Rule of
Law Initiative with little or no thought given to program specifics – things like funding,
organization, and programming.  The sense among these observers is that the US wanted to
announce the new initiative for political reasons – it would constitute one of the summit’s
“deliverables”, to use the diplomatic lingo – but it hadn’t given much thought to how such an
initiative would actually work.
24  According to another American observer, the lack of follow-
through has irritated many on the Chinese side, who apparently were led to believe that funding for
cooperative programs would be forthcoming.  These people now feel a sense of frustration and
grievance that the US government doesn’t put its money where its mouth is.
25  One US scholar
summed up the feeling of many in both the US and Chinese legal communities, stating that, despite
all the declarations and speeches, “there’s really no interest in high levels of the US government in
rule of law in China.”
26
If this sentiment is correct, this whole paper may be gratuitous.  There’s little point in
assessing and critiquing the underlying theoretical assumptions of a program that doesn’t exist.
Moreover, given the tight political constraints under which China law reform programs must
operate, any projects that actually get funded will reflect what is politically practical, rather than any
larger vision of how to effectively promote legal change and development in China.  This was the
view put to me by one official in the State Department involved in developing these programs.
27
Nevertheless, I think there are four reasons it’s worth taking the time to think about and
critique the theory of law and development implicit in the China Rule of Law Initiative.  First,
unlikely as it may be, political realities could change such that substantial US government resources
become available for China rule of law projects.  If this occurs, it would behoove policy makers to
have thought through the more fundamental issues ahead of time.  Second, even if the initiative
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24 Interview (G).
25 Interview (F).  Another NGO official, though, downplayed the importance of these feelings of frustration on the
Chinese side.  According to this source, “the Chinese are realistic.  They know that leaders and initiatives come and go,
but the work will go on, as it has been going on for the last 20 years.” [Interview (E).]
26 Interview (H).
27 Interview (A).9
must operate under significant constraints, there is still room for variation in the types of programs
that are sponsored, and in how scarce political and financial resources are allocated.  Third, even if
no substantive programs come directly out of the China Rule of Law Initiative, the policy
discussions surrounding that program, and issues with which it deals, affect how people think about
legal development in China.  This may have indirect effects on the approach to legal reform that is
adopted outside the government sector.  Finally, the justifications articulated for promoting law
reform can affect political support for the law and development enterprise. Policy makers, in their
public rhetoric, can create expectations for what law reform programs can accomplish, and if these
expectations are unfulfilled, support for law reform programs can evaporate quickly.  This
phenomenon, it seems, has something to do with the collapse of the first Law and Development
Movement.  And the same concern has been raised by at least one scholar about the China Rule of
Law Initiative: “The danger is over-selling the project and having people become disillusioned and
abandoning it altogether.”
28  Thus, despite the risk of irrelevance, I will push on to discuss, first,
what the US policy objectives seem to be; second, what strategy the US appears to have adopted to
achieve these objectives.
II.  Conflicting Objectives: What is the “Rule of Law”?
One of the most fundamental questions one must ask about this or any law and
development program concerns what, exactly, is being promoted.  The US has declared that it wants
to see China build “the rule of law”.
29  But “rule of law” is a notoriously plastic phrase.  Sometimes it
is used in an expansive, substantive sense, and is meant to describe a legal system that effectively
protects specific individual rights.
30  However, many scholars have criticized this use of the term as
too broad.  As Joseph Raz puts it, “If the rule of law is the rule of good law then to explain its
nature is to propound a complete social philosophy.  But if so the term lacks any useful function.
We have no need to be converted to the rule of law just in order to discover that to believe in it is to
                                                          
28 Interview (F).
29 See, for example, “Remarks by the President in Address on China and the National Interest” (Voice of America, 24
October 1997), available from the White House web site; “Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright, Remarks at the
National Judges’ College, Beijing” (Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, 20 April 1998), available from
the State Department web site; John Shattuck “Statement before the House Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Washington DC, 1 April 1998), available from the State Department web site.
30 See, for example Dworkin, Ronald A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) pp.11-1210
believe that good should triumph.”
31  Other scholars stress that the rule of law implies rules that are
publicly-known and predictable, but do not necessarily embody specific substantive principles.
32  Still
others stress that the essence of the rule of law is the constraint of government discretion – here the
“rule of law” is contrasted with the “rule of man.”
33  Thus, the definition of the phase itself has been
the subject of sustained academic debate for at least a century.
34
The ambiguity of the term “rule of law” is a disadvantage in academic discourse.  However,
the same ambiguity is an advantage in political discourse, which may go a long way to explaining
why “rule of law” is used as the catchphrase for the China legal assistance projects.  One academic
China law expert put the point bluntly: “‘Rule of Law’ has no meaning.  Everyone uses the phrase
because everyone can get behind it and it might make it easier to get funding.”
35  Another scholar
makes a similar observation on how the phrase is used in the policy discourse: “The ‘rule of law’
means whatever one wants it to mean.  It’s an empty vessel that everyone can fill up with their own
vision.”
36  This ambiguity serves a very clear policy purpose, stated explicitly by one State
Department official: “The beauty of the ‘rule of law’ is that it’s neutral.  No one – the human rights
community, the business community, the Chinese leadership – objects to it.”
37
The political usefulness of this ambiguity is evident in how the “rule of law” is used in
official US statements.  When she was addressing US business representatives, Secretary of State
Madeline Albright stressed that the “rule of law” will make China a good place to do business.
38
When responding to a reporter concerned with China’s treatment of political dissidents, she
trumpeted the Rule of Law Initiative as a program that will address these concerns.
39  Indeed, in one
speech, Albright listed all the virtues of a “rule of law” society.  These included effective criminal law
enforcement, lack of official corruption, protection of the environment, full political participation by
                                                          
31 Raz, Joseph “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” Law Quarterly Review 93:195-211 (1977) pp. 195-196.
32 See, for example, Waldron, Jeremy “The Rule of Law in Contemporary Liberal Theory” Ratio Juris 2(1):79-96 (1989)
33 Spader, Dean “Rule of Law v. Rule of Man: The Search for the Golden Zigzag Between Conflicting Fundamental
Values” Journal of Criminal Justice 12:379-394 (1984)
34 For comparisons of different conceptions of the rule of law, see Craig, Paul “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of
the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework” Public Law (Autumn 1997) 467-487; Summers, Robert “The Ideal Socio-
Legal Order: Its ‘Rule of Law’ Dimension” Ratio Juris 1(2):154-161 (1988); Summers, Robert “A Formal Theory of the




38 “Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright. Remarks to U.S. Business Representatives, Sheraton International Club,
Beijing” (Office of the Spokesman, 30 April 1998) Available from the State Department web site.
39 “Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright. Interview on CBS-TV ‘Face the Nation’” (Office of the Spokesman, 28 June
1998) Available from the State Department web site.11
all citizens, protection of individual rights, and peaceful participation in the global economy.
40  It’s
easy to see why such an expansive definition of the rule of law is politically advantageous.  After all,
if the rule of law includes all these things, who could object to promoting it?  And if the government
has an initiative to promote the rule of law, isn’t the government addressing all these concerns?
Not everyone in the field is thrilled with the way the US government is using the phrase,
however.  One scholar finds it “troubling that the rule of law is packaged by the US Chamber of
Commerce as a good thing for the sale of US products.  This is not really what is traditionally meant
by ‘rule of law’”.
41  Tom Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment warned that rule-of-law promotion,
while useful, “will not miraculously eliminate the hard choices between ideals and interests” that
have plagued US China policy.
42  Another academic observer is even more critical, arguing that we
need to push beyond “the ‘feel good’ rhetoric of advocacy of the rule of law” in order to understand
the real effects legal reforms are having in China – effects that are not well-understood, and by no
means always necessarily desirable.
43  And another law professor warned that, while using the phrase
“rule of law” may seem like a good way to get different groups together, the danger is the “potential
for acrimony and conflict once people realize they’re very far apart.”
44  The US Administration may
be trying to avoid a clash between commercial and human rights interests by stressing the rule of
law, but this harmony of interests may prove more rhetorical than real.
45
Another, perhaps more important aspect of the ambiguity of the term concerns divergence
in American and Chinese law reform goals.  To the US government, “rule of law” is an attractive
term, not only because it may allow the American business and human rights communities to rally
around a common banner, but also because it is seen as an area in which the Chinese side has an
interest, and where there can therefore be productive cooperation.
46  It’s generally agreed, though,
that the US and Chinese sides have different things in mind when they talk about the rule of law.
Indeed, it’s not even entirely true that the term “rule of law” is generally acceptable to the Chinese
government.  Prior to the Clinton-Jiang summit in 1997, the US side had drafted a Memorandum of
Understanding that identified “Rule of Law” as one potential area of Sino-US cooperation.  The
                                                          
40 “Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright. Remarks and Q&A session at Delaware Theater Company, Wilmington,
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41 Interview (H).
42 Carothers, Tom “The Rule of Law Revival” Foreign Affairs 77(2):95-106 (1998) p. 106.
43 Interview (I).
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45 Most of the people I interviewed in the government and NGO communities insisted that, at this stage of China’s legal
development, there is in fact such a harmony of interests – specifically with regard to the need for greater transparency,
accountability, and predictability of the legal system.12
Chinese side strongly objected to the use of the phrase, which was considered politically sensitive.
47
Thus, while the Fact Sheet released by the White House detailing the accomplishments of the
October 1997 Summit lists “promoting the rule of law” as an area where the two sides agreed to
cooperate, the official Joint Statement uses the phrase “cooperation in the field of law” instead.
48  In
the last couple of years, the Chinese government seems to have become more comfortable using the
term “rule of law”.  However, the phrase the Chinese government has started using is yifazhiguo,
meaning, “a country ruled according to law”.  This phrase has started to replace fazhi, which was the
original translation of the nineteenth century concept of the German Rechtstaat.  Though both are
translated into English as “rule of law”, the former term lacks the political connotations of the
latter.
49  Some have suggested that a more accurate translation of the preferred Chinese phrase
would be “rule by law”.
50
Despite the ambiguity – perhaps the deliberate ambiguity – of the phrase “rule of law”, the
US and Chinese visions of what this phrase means, and their legal reform objectives, are very
different.  The US government may try to take advantage of the ambiguity of the term in order to
“sell” legal reform to the Chinese, but ultimately the State Department conception of the rule of law
has a clear substantive and political component.  The State Department official who claimed that the
beauty of the “rule of law” is that it is a neutral phrase stated that the rule of law, to the US, means
law that conforms to international standards, and a legal system that protects individual rights and
preserves justice.  According to this official, rule of law traditionally has been, and has been seen in
the Department as, an aspect of US human rights policy.
51  Another State Department official said
that “rule of law” as used by the Department incorporates some substantive legal rights, though
these rights need not be identical to those found in the United States.  According to this individual,
the “rule of law” means that all people are subject to and have access to a fair, equitable, transparent,
and efficient legal system.  Another official in the State Department argued instead that the essence
of the rule of law was predictability, though this person also claimed that the legal system needed
rules seen by the people as substantively right and just in order to be effective.
52  Overall, there
appears to be a general sense that the “rule of law” – that is, the vision of legal development that the
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US wants to promote – has a clear and central substantive component related to the protection of
individual rights.  This belief seems to be shared in the non-governmental community as well.
53
This is obviously not the vision of legal reform advocated by the Chinese government, and
not what Beijing means when it articulates “rule of law” – or “a country ruled by law” – as a policy
goal.  The primary Chinese motivation for undertaking legal reform, according to most American
observers, is economic.  The need to attract foreign investment and integrate with the global
economy was cited by experts both in and out of the US government as an important motive for the
Chinese to undertake legal reform.
54  Other possible motives include China’s desire not to be
perceived as a rogue, the need to control corruption, and the sense that a more rule-based system
would the central government improve control over the provinces.
55  But, the Chinese leadership
wants to make sure legal reforms are limited to specific areas, and that they remain under the control
of the central government.  Both US government officials and non-governmental experts maintain
that, while China wants legal reform in the commercial sphere, the leadership wants to prevent
reforms from seeping into the political sphere, and doesn’t want any reforms that would undermine
the central leadership’s decision-making authority.
56
This divergence between the two sides’ fundamental objectives in this whole endeavor is the
source of the most important strategic problem for the US Rule of Law Initiative, or indeed for any
program that takes the US vision of a substantive rule of law as the objective of Chinese legal
reform.  Given that the Chinese side – at least the central leadership – does not share American
objectives, how should legal reform proceed?  It is here that underlying, implicit theories of legal and
social change become important.  For the US China Rule of Law Initiative to be coherent – that is,
for the means adopted to match the end envisioned – law must interact with society and with
political institutions in a certain way.  Specifically, legal reforms undertaken by the Chinese for
commercial purposes must lead to a broader transformation in the legal, and ultimately the political,
system.  This vision of snowballing legal reform is the cornerstone of the US rule-of-law promotion
strategy, and will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
52 Interview (C).
53 Interview (D).
54 Interviews (A, B, C, D, E, F).
55 Interview (F).
56 Interviews (B, C, D).14
III.  The Trojan Horse of Legal Reform
Given the divergence of US and Chinese objectives, the US appears to have adopted what I
will call a “Trojan Horse” strategy.
57  The US belief seems to be that the Chinese will adopt an initial
set of legal reforms and legal education programs in order to achieve economic goals, and that those
reforms, once adopted, will take on a life of their own.  The growth of legal means for dealing with
commercial disputes will foster a culture of legality that will spread beyond economic transactions to
other areas.  The logic of controlling administrative discretion and corruption in the name of
economics will evolve into stronger legal controls on government discretion at all levels.  Because
the same judicial institutions and legal profession handle commercial and other types of legal issues,
improving training and organization will lead to improvements in all areas, even if the original
motive is strictly economic.  And the success of legal reforms in the commercial area will strengthen
the hand of reformers in China who want to push for legal reforms in other areas.
A State Department official described the basic strategy as follows: “Once the Chinese open
the door to legal reform, they won’t be able to control it, and legal reform – and the principles of
legality, predictability, and judicial independence – will seep into other areas.”  According to this
official, because the underlying assumption is that the rule of law will spread as time goes on, the US
strategy is to “plant seeds in patches of sunlight.”
58  This person went on to draw an analogy to
China’s experience with the internet.  The Chinese knew they needed to adopt this new technology
for economic reasons.  They wanted to control it, but ultimately couldn’t.  As with the internet, the
argument goes, so too with law.
The Trojan Horse approach to Chinese legal reform appears pervasive on the US side, in the
NGO community as well as in the government.
59  An official in one of the major NGOs doing work
in this area stated that the organization subscribes to the idea that once legal reform is introduced,
there will be an inevitable transformation over time, even if the reform is initially introduced for
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commercial reasons.  The interest in promoting complex market transactions, it was asserted, would
lead to the protection of individual rights, though such a transformation might take a long time.
60
An official in another US NGO made a similar claim, arguing that the organization’s fundamental
view of law reform is that once you start, you won’t be able to stop; once the Chinese have a law to
cover one thing, they’ll find they need more laws to cover more things.
61
The Trojan Horse view even affects those who are openly skeptical of the US approach to
this Chinese law reform.  To take one striking example, an academic who works on legal education,
who was generally critical of the US Rule of Law Initiative, described legal education strategy in the
following way: “A lot of the things we do in legal education are not explicit.  That’s not to say we
bring in a Trojan Horse.  But we need to get into institutions first.  Once we start up training
programs, we can do all sorts of other stuff.  The Ministries have no idea what we’re doing – they
just think we’re running some neat training program.”  This person went on to say that the idea is to
teach Chinese students a more critical approach to law and policy analysis, concluding that training
Chinese lawyers in critical thinking “is the most subversive thing we can get to happen.  That starts
to create subterranean fissures, by changing the way people think, understand, and process issues.
That’s ultimately more effective than standing in Tienanmen Square.”
62  Despite the disclaimer, it’s
hard to imagine a more explicit exposition of the Trojan Horse strategy.  The Chinese Ministries let
US legal educators in because they want more legal training (implicitly for economic reasons); once
established, the education programs foster a type of critical thinking intended to lead to more
dramatic political reform – presumably reform that the current government would not want.
Another scholar, also involved with legal education efforts, described the appropriate US
strategy in similar, though less secretive, terms.  This person noted that the US government and
NGOs have been trying to sell legal reform as a package deal – that is, they have been trying to
convince the Chinese side that in the long term respect for the rule of law will be undermined if they
try to be selective and partial in the areas where they allow legal reform.
63  (This scholar didn’t take a
position on whether this assessment was accurate or not.)
In addition to the belief that legal reform, once introduced into China, will spread
throughout the system, many on the US side maintain that there is support for such reform within
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China. State Department officials maintain that there’s a split within the Chinese elite, and that in
some sectors there’s the political will to push for broader reform.
64  These sources generally
concede, however, that the high-level leadership, though willing to take risks to achieve economic
goals, is not enthusiastic about widespread legal reform outside the commercial and low-level
administrative spheres.  Thus, the fundamental approach is still basically a Trojan Horse strategy.
The Chinese leadership is betting that it will be able to control the scope and extent of legal reform;
the US government and NGOs interested in building the rule of law are betting that it will not.
IV.  Problems With the Trojan Horse Strategy
What are the presumptions about the nature of law and the dynamics of legal reform that
give rise to the Trojan Horse strategy?  It may, of course, be the case that it is less a well-thought-out
strategy than a way to rationalize pursuing programs that are, of necessity, limited.  But this is
perhaps too cynical.  Most of the people I talked to in both the State Department and in major
NGOs seemed sincere in their belief that limited, modest legal reforms would eventually – perhaps
inevitably – lead to more fundamental reforms in the direction of the rule of law.  The principles
behind the Trojan Horse strategy therefore ought to be examined more closely, to see whether there
is a sound basis for this conviction.
The assumption of the strategy is that legal reforms in certain narrow sectors will diffuse
throughout the legal and political system, leading to widespread transformation in the direction of
the US vision of a “rule of law” society.  But the mechanism by which this diffusion will take place is
not clear, and is rarely specified explicitly.  In fact, at least three mechanisms are conceivable, and all
three are evident in the views expressed by officials in the government, academic, and NGO
communities.
The first mechanism posits a fundamentally integrated and interdependent legal system.  In
this view, legal systems operate according to certain basic principles and institutions, and changes in
institutions or principles in one area ultimately lead to changes in other areas as well.  One can’t,
according to this theory, get impartial, rule-based adjudication in contract law while preserving
political, discretionary decision-making in other matters – at least not in the long term.  The legal
system is too interdependent and institutionally coherent for such strict separation of spheres.  Thus,
once China begins legal reform in the economic sector, similar types of reforms will start to
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penetrate other sectors as well.  This process would take time, but nonetheless it would result in the
snowballing of “rule of law” principles throughout the Chinese legal system.
The second mechanism is similar to the first, but sees the unity of the legal system at the
level of ideas about law rather than the internal interdependence of legal institutions.  This second
mechanism concerns the transformation of “legal culture”, especially the legal culture of judges,
lawyers, and other professionals closely involved with the legal system.  In this view, providing these
professionals with sophisticated training – initially adopted by the Chinese government with the goal
of making legal professionals more effective “transaction cost engineers” for market interactions –
will change the way they think about law and legality.  Growing practical experience with the
principles of legality will contribute to this general transformation in legal culture.  The bench and
bar will become a force for reform, and the legal system they inhabit will become more consistent, in
all spheres, with the American substantive vision of the rule of law.  Therefore, even if the first
mechanism is flawed, and there is nothing inherent in the internal logic of legal systems that causes
reforms to spread, legal reform and legal education and training programs can still have a spillover
effect by altering legal culture.
The third mechanism is more indirect.  It is hypothesized that legal reforms in the economic
and low-level administrative spheres will give people more autonomy, and increase their willingness
and ability to challenge state authorities.  This increase in the scope of individual action, generated
by laws designed to secure property and contract rights and to protect people from arbitrary
administrative action, will create a political base for further reform.  Thus, legal, economic, and
political reform feed on each other, with reform in one area strengthening the demand for further
reforms in other areas.  Even if both of the first two mechanisms fail, then, successful legal reforms
in the fields of economic and administrative law may still snowball to broader reform by
empowering Chinese citizens to demand more extensive changes in the system.
In order for the Trojan Horse strategy to make sense, one or more of these mechanisms
must operate effectively.
65  If they do not, it’s hard to see what justification those on the American
side have for believing that legal reform will inevitably spread and foster a legal system consistent
with the substantive vision of the “rule of law”.  That doesn’t mean that the legal reform programs
being adopted and advocated are bad ideas.  They might well be good ideas, especially if it can be
established that improving the functioning of Chinese legal institutions in specific areas is possible18
and desirable.  But the Trojan Horse strategy articulated by US governmental and non-governmental
advocates of legal reform may prove flawed.  Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that all three
hypothesized mechanisms for the spread of legal reform are problematic.  Each will be considered in
turn.
1.  Mechanism One: The Interdependent, Unitary Legal System
Some advocates of the Trojan Horse strategy implicitly presume that “rule of law” in one
sphere will spread to other spheres, simply because that is the nature of law.  Like the internet, the
analogy goes, the “technology” of legal modernization, by its nature, cannot be controlled.
Specifically, it is thought that commercial law reform that builds an effectively independent
judiciary
66 operating according to transparent, publicly-known rules, and staffed by a well-trained
bench and bar, will foster similar sorts of changes in those fields of law more closely related to
human rights concerns.  This, proponents assert, is the nature of law.  On the other hand, the
Chinese central government, as has already been mentioned, has a strong incentive to limit “rule of
law” reforms to the commercial sector, and to branches of administrative law that increase central
control of the bureaucracy and check abuses by low-level officials.  The US strategy implicitly (and
sometimes explicitly) presumes that this is impossible.
However, a theoretical basis for this belief appears lacking.  The dynamics of inevitably
spreading legal reform are almost always couched in terms of assertions, analogies, or metaphors.  I
know of no theoretical work that gives a solid foundation to this hypothesis.  Furthermore, there is
some empirical evidence that setting up firewalls between sectors of the legal system – as the
Chinese wish to do – is indeed possible.  Consider the example of courts in authoritarian Spain
under Franco, a case analyzed by Jose Toharia.
 67   Toharia noted that in Spain, political
authoritarianism co-existed with a great deal of judicial independence.  Indeed, not only did the
Spanish judiciary have a great deal of formal independence, but judges tended to be more liberal
than the regime, and frequently more liberal than the general population.  Moreover, corruption and
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political interference in judges’ activities seemed minimal.  The government also apparently didn’t
use other types of indirect controls, such as political screening of judicial candidates or manipulation
of the promotion procedures, to insure the pliability of the judiciary.
How could a right-wing authoritarian regime tolerate such a liberal, independent judiciary?
The simple answer is that, on sensitive issues, the judiciary had no power.  The regular courts
handled only those cases that were politically innocuous.  Politically significant cases were handled
by special tribunals – labor courts, military courts, and, most importantly, the State Security Tribunal
– that were much more closely controlled by the executive.  Not only did the government
successfully control those areas of the law that might threaten its power and policies, but this system
helped it economize on resources.  After all, monitoring and disciplining the judiciary takes time and
money.  It was much easier to simply grant the judiciary a relatively high degree of independence in
non-threatening areas, and maintain strict control over tribunals that handled sensitive disputes.
The analogy to the Chinese situation should be obvious.  There is no particular reason that
the Chinese government couldn’t undertake extensive legal and judicial reform in certain areas –
such as commercial and low-level administrative law – and maintain close control over politically-
sensitive issues that touch on matters of political dissent, labor unrest, and so forth.  In fact, China
already appears to be making efforts to set up institutional firewalls between areas where legal
reform is seen as desirable and areas where it is considered suspect.  China is developing a separate
system of rules for foreign enterprises, and disputes concerning foreign businesses are frequently
referred to a commercial arbitration body rather than the Chinese courts.  The system doesn’t work
perfectly, and weaknesses of domestic Chinese legal institutions still create headaches for foreign
investors, but it’s hard to see why the basic strategy of keeping different areas of law institutionally
separate cannot work in China.
68  If the Franco government could tolerate and control a judiciary
with substantial formal independence, a high degree of autonomy, and relatively liberal political
attitudes, authoritarian China could certainly tolerate much more modest reforms.
A single counter-example does not disprove the prediction that legal reforms intended to
improve economic performance will not have spillover effects into other areas.  And it may be that
the types of laws needed for more efficient commercial activity – clear property rights, for example,
or transparent administrative procedures related to taxation and regulation – are themselves
beneficial for individual rights and well-being.  But the Trojan Horse strategy US advocates seem to20
have in mind presumes that legal reforms will spread throughout the system – that legality will
prove, like the internet, uncontrollable.  Yet the Spanish case, and China’s own efforts to keep legal
issues separate, gives us reason to doubt this strong spillover hypothesis.  More general empirical
research suggests that authoritarian regimes are frequently able to adopt systems that effectively
protect property and contract rights, without more extensive reforms in other parts of the legal
system.
69  Therefore, if advocates of the Trojan Horse strategy are to make the case that “legalism”
or the “rule of law” will be able to jump the firewalls the Chinese government can set up, the
mechanism must be specified much more clearly.  As of now, the theory behind this first
mechanism is not well-developed, and there is not terribly good empirical evidence for it either.
2.  Mechanism Two: Building a Universal “Legal Culture”
Even if different sections of the legal system can be kept institutionally separate, certain
types of legal reform projects might still be able to smuggle in the seeds of a broader transformation
in the Chinese legal system.  One way this might be done is via programs intended to change China’s
“legal culture” – especially of the bench and bar, and also of other professionals and government
officials who work closely with the legal system. This is an explicit goal articulated by people inside
and outside of the US government.
70  In this view, the Chinese government recognizes that it needs
better-trained judges and lawyers, and will therefore allow US-sponsored legal education projects.
These education programs, however, have the potential, over time, to transform the way the Chinese
elite thinks about the law.  Hence, much of the Trojan Horse legal reform strategy stresses legal
education and training of judges and lawyers, not only to improve their skills, but to change China’s
legal culture.
71
What exactly is China’s “legal culture”, and how should it be changed?  This is not an easy
question to answer, in part because the term “legal culture” is about as clear and precise as the term
“rule of law”.  And, much as “rule of law” gets used as shorthand for “a desirable legal system”,
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“legal culture” tends to be used as shorthand for “what people think about law”, or sometimes even
“those aspects of the legal system we can’t observe or measure.”  Indeed, the phrase is so ill-defined
that some have questioned whether there’s any point in using it at all.
72  Because of the vagueness of
the term, I will focus on only one aspect of Chinese “legal culture” that comes up in discussions of
legal reform: the extent to which Chinese lawyers adopt a “formalistic” or “instrumental” approach
to law.  This focus is chosen, first, because it seems to capture one of the most important elements
considered part of China’s legal culture, and second, because the problems in this area illustrate
broader difficulties with this mechanism of fostering widespread systemic change.
“Formalism” and “instrumentalism” are terms used to describe the way lawyers and judges
think about how laws should be interpreted and applied.  The formalistic approach is characterized
by relatively mechanical application of rules, and emphasis on statutory language.  The instrumental
approach places more stress on thinking about the goals a given law is meant to achieve, and the
likely real-world consequences of making a particular legal decision.  These are both obviously ideal
types, and no legal practitioner is ever purely formalistic or purely instrumental.  But these ideal
types do illustrate a potentially important difference in “legal culture” that is worth considering in
the context of Chinese legal reform and the Trojan Horse strategy.
For those that focus on this issue, the consensus seems to be that the Chinese approach to
law is too formalistic, and that Chinese students tend to approach law with the attitude of wanting to
know “the right answer” rather than thinking critically about the issues involved in legal questions.
73
(It is important to note that these opinions come from the NGO and academic communities.  The
State Department officials who spoke to this issue commented that the government does not have a
position on the correct approach to legal education, but will follow the lead of the Chinese, the
academic community, and NGOs.
74)  The goal of several of the people working in the area of legal
education in China appears to be getting the Chinese legal community to take a more critical, policy-
oriented – implicitly instrumental – approach to the law.  (Others in the NGO community, however,
noted that these sorts of issues – formalistic versus critical or instrumental approaches in legal
education – haven’t really become important yet.
75)  At least one leading academic working on legal
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education, quoted above, argues that this sort of change in mindset will prove subversive, and could
lead to widespread reform throughout the system.
76
Setting aside for the moment whether such a change in mindset is even possible, we should
consider whether it is desirable.  It might be heretical to suggest, in an academic paper, that there are
drawbacks to spreading purposive, critical thinking in the legal community.  But the critiques leveled
at the first Law and Development Movement give us reason to consider the possibility that such
drawbacks might exist.  Much of the Law and Development Movement was concerned with
changing legal education in Latin America, and some of the most scathing attacks on the movement
concerned its attempts to export an allegedly inappropriate American model of legal education and
practice.
77  It is worth restating the basic elements of Trubek and Galanter’s critique of legal
education projects in Latin America and elsewhere in the developing world.
According to Trubek and Galanter, American law and development scholars believed that
lawyers in these countries should be trained in a more instrumental, less formalistic approach to law.
An instrumental perspective, in this view, “would generate ‘legal development,’ which would in turn
foster a system of governance by universal, purposive rules, and would accordingly contribute to the
enhancement of liberty, equality, participation, and rationality.”
78  The problem, according to Trubek
and Galanter, was that this view neglected the social and political context in which this change in
“legal culture” took place.  An expanded and modernized legal profession tended to increase social
inequality, since the social elite had greater access to the better-educated and professionalized legal
personnel.  Furthermore, these conservative elites could make use of better-trained lawyers to block
changes that threatened their interests.  Also, the instrumental orientation actually weakened what
legal guarantees of individual rights did exist.  Formalism can actually provide a kind of protection
for individuals from government policy; instrumentalism makes it easier for individual “rights” to be
circumvented in the name of some state-sponsored developmental goal.
79
The point is not that there’s something inherently anti-reform about instrumentalism, or that
sophisticated, critical thinking about the principles behind law is somehow pernicious.  But there’s
no reason to presume that these modes of thought are necessarily conducive to reform, either.
Trubek and Galanter may have overstated the negative aspects of cultivating the instrumental
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approach to law, but the basic concern is still valid.  Social and political realities – especially the
material interests of the legal elite and those members of society able to purchase their services –
probably has more to do with how laws are interpreted and applied than the particular style of legal
reasoning taught in law schools.  Legal instrumentalism in the service of conservative groups is no
more likely to spread deeper reform than strict legal formalism
Perhaps legal culture does matter, and changes in legal education may make a difference in
legal culture.  But there is no strong evidence to suggest that this impact is more than marginal.  In
any event, there’s enough indeterminacy about the relationship between the types of “legal culture”
that can be influenced by legal education that this mechanism for the Trojan Horse is problematic at
best.  Moreover, the criticisms of the first mechanism apply, for the most part, to this second
mechanism as well.  If the Chinese government is able to cordon off and control politically salient
sections of the legal system, then changes in the legal culture of the overall legal community might
not have much of an effect on the core human rights issues many in the United States are concerned
about.  Remember, the “legal culture” of Spanish judges under Franco seemed quite liberal.
80
In sum, this second mechanism for Trojan Horse legal reform rests on three dubious
assumptions.  First, that it is possible to influence Chinese legal culture.  Second, that these cultural
changes, if possible, would have desirable consequences for broader reform.  Third, that a broad
change in legal culture, even if generally conducive to greater reform, would be able to affect those
sensitive areas of the law over which the Chinese government wants to maintain strict political
control.
3.  Mechanism Three: Building a Constituency for Further Reform
A third possible mechanism through which partial legal reforms might generate more
widespread reform is the development of a public base of support for reform.  The idea is that legal
reforms in the economic sphere – especially those that guarantee property and contract rights, and
those that provide means of redress against the administration – will make people better off, more
secure, and willing and able to push for bigger reforms, not just in the economic realm, but overall.
Thus, even if the spread of “rule of law” is not driven by the internal logic of the legal system, and
even if it’s not possible to change “legal culture” in ways that generate broader changes, partial
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reforms – to the extent that they are successful on their own terms – will create the social and
political base for more reform.
The first obvious problem with this view has already been mentioned.  Legal reform might
well strengthen the position of conservative forces in society that oppose more widespread political,
social, and economic reforms.  This possibility has been discussed above, in reference to the efforts
of the first Law and Development Movement to cultivate a professionalized bench and bar, and
promote a more “instrumental” or “realist” adjudicative approach.  Second, also as mentioned, some
authoritarian regimes are able to provide relatively secure property and contract rights, yet still resist
broader political or social reforms.  But even putting these problems aside, there are reasons to
question the assumption that legal reforms in contract, property, and administrative law will
necessarily generate widespread public support for further reform.
There are many reasons to question this assumption; here I will focus on only one.  We must
consider the fact that greater “legalization” of economic relationships in China might have
undesirable, unintended consequences as alternative informal institutions are disrupted.  According
to one expert, a fair assessment of current law reform efforts must “try to take account of the ways
in which the elaboration of the formal legal system is both by design and unwittingly eroding less
formal institutions and customs.”
81  Such erosion, according to this observer, is most apparent in the
decline in mediation that has accompanied the rise in litigation.  Changing patterns of dispute
resolution may lead to a constricting of access of poorer people, especially in rural areas.  Such a
phenomenon clearly could have negative implications for a theory of spreading reform based on a
growing constituency of previously marginalized Chinese.  This mechanism for spreading reform
assumes that reforms make people become both stronger and more pro-reform.  But even if it can
be established that the disruption in informal institutions is a temporary problem, and in the long
term a shift to more formal, law-based institutions would make everyone better off, the erosion of
informal institutions in the short term can make people politically weaker, more anti-reform, or
both.
Again, an example from another part of the world may help illustrate how reforms in formal
institutions, if not thought through carefully, can have serious negative consequences on the general
population as informal institutions are undermined.  This time, the example comes from legal
reforms introduced by the British in rural areas around Bombay in the nineteenth century, described
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by Rachel Kranton and Anand Swamy.
82  The British governors of the region observed, correctly,
that the rural credit markets were characterized by local moneylenders who were able to extract
monopoly rents from borrowers – that is, they were able to charge interest rates in excess of those
that could have been charged in a competitive market.  They were able to do this because the
lenders relied on informal mechanisms to enforce debt repayment.  Reliance on these sorts of
enforcement mechanisms in turn depended on ties between the lenders and other local elites.
Hence only a small number of lenders could operate in any given village.  The British reasoned that
effective formal contract enforcement would allow lenders to operate in many more villages, would
create a competitive market, and would bring interest rates for farmers down.
According to Kranton and Swamy, the British were right about all of these things.  But what
they did not anticipate was that the introduction of effective formal contract enforcement
undermined what was effectively an informal insurance arrangement between lenders and
borrowers.  When lenders could charge monopolistic interest rates, they also had a vested interest in
individual borrowers remaining economically viable.  If a borrower suffered an unexpected disaster
– if a cow died, or a field was destroyed by flood, or crop prices collapsed – the lender had an
incentive to forgive debt, or at least postpone repayment.  After all, any given borrower represented
a future stream of monopolistic interest rates to the lender.  That stream would disappear if the
borrower lost everything and had to become a wage laborer.  Why should the creditor kill a goose
that lays golden eggs?  But once effective civil courts created a competitive market in rural credit,
there were no more golden eggs – interest rates were forced down to competitive market rates – and
creditors had no reason to expect that they would deal with any particular borrower again with any
frequency.  Therefore, creditors had less incentive to forgive debt or postpone repayment if the
borrower suffered a disaster.  Thus, borrowers were better off in good years, but if a disaster hit,
they could lose everything.  This problem could be averted, of course, if borrowers could purchase
insurance.  But effective insurance markets didn’t exist at the time.  Hence Kranton and Swamy’s
warning about the hazards of “piecemeal” reform.  The introduction of effective civil law did create
a competitive credit market, but it also destroyed the existing informal insurance arrangement
without replacing it with anything.  In some villages, these reforms – coupled with exogenous
economic shocks – led to rioting.
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This example may at first seem far removed from Chinese “rule of law” reform.  But it is not
entirely implausible that the Chinese system – lacking as it does both effective formal contract
enforcement and widespread formal insurance markets – has evolved informal risk-sharing
mechanisms that are closely integrated with the informal contracting structure, and that could be
disrupted by legal reform.  More importantly, given that the Trojan Horse strategy relies on pushing
incremental reforms – “planting seeds in patches of sunlight” – and hoping the reforms will
snowball, the type of phenomenon the preceding case illustrates is especially important, even if this
specific problem is not an issue.
In the absence (or sometimes even in the presence) of formal legal institutions, complex
informal institutions of contract, property, risk-sharing, and dispute resolution can develop.
83  New
legal reforms, especially those that prove effective, may disturb or undermine these informal
institutions.  This may be a good thing, but it may not be.  Partial reforms – an inherent part of the
“Trojan Horse” strategy – are particularly likely candidates to disrupt an important informal
institution without providing an adequate substitute.  The above example of increasing litigation and
the rising quality of legal professionals potentially undermining mediation and other dispute
resolution mechanisms accessible to the rural poor is one example of this kind of problem.
The fact that partial reforms can disrupt existing informal institutions may undermine the
third mechanism for the Trojan Horse strategy.  This mechanism assumes that reform protects and
strengthens the interests and influence of pro-reform groups.  But if legal reform undermines
informal institutions that these groups have evolved to protect their interests, this mechanism
cannot work.  Even worse, if the unintended consequences create especially serious social problems,
there may be a backlash against reforms.  The point is not that legal reform should never proceed
because informal institutions will be disrupted, but that legal reformers ought to proceed with
caution.  Sometimes incremental reform can be worse than no reform at all.  And we cannot simply
presume that incremental reforms will always lay the groundwork for more extensive changes.
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4.  Additional Problems: Tensions and Conflicts Between Fundamental Goals
These examples suggest that the three most obvious candidate mechanisms for the Trojan
Horse strategy, while not necessarily wrong, are problematic.  At the very least, they need to be
thought through much more thoroughly.  But even if we could be confident that limited Chinese
legal reforms would lead to more widespread evolution towards a “rule of law” system, and that the
US government or NGOs could in some way support or influence this process, there are additional
problems that must be considered.  Here I will discuss four.  First, genuine legal reforms that allow
citizens to challenge the legality of government action may actually have negative implications for
pressing forward with neo-liberal economic reform.  Second, two of the most important aspects of
the institutional reform agenda – fostering independent, impartial adjudication and controlling
corruption – may come into conflict.  Third, there is a tension between the two “rule of law” values
of predictability and equity – a tension that has not been satisfactorily resolved in the West.  Fourth,
there is a danger that US involvement in rule of law projects in China will, despite the best
intentions of American policymakers, create the perception that the US is helping to support and
legitimize China’s authoritarian system.
The first problem – that rule of law reform may hinder needed policy flexibility – may seem
far-fetched, especially given that the Chinese government is not likely to accept any real legal
constraints on its central decision making.  Nevertheless, it is worth at least considering the fact that
widespread “rule of law” reform, if it is successful in its goal of giving more Chinese groups a voice
in controlling the government, might not necessarily be a good thing for Chinese economic
development.  Indeed, the “rule of law” envisioned by the US government may actually create
obstacles to other types of economic reforms that the American government favors.  After all, the
same means that can be used to check arbitrary government abuses can be used to obstruct dramatic
policy changes.  As one scholar points out, a common (though controversial) argument holds that
the insulation of bureaucrats from politics was an important element of East Asian economic
development, and this position would imply a tension between effective economic policy and the
rule of law.
84
For a more concrete example of how rule-of-law reforms can have unintended consequences
on economic liberalization, consider the case of Costa Rica.  The Costa Rican government created a
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new chamber of the Supreme Court (the fourth chamber, or Sala IV) in the 1980s, with the mandate
to review the constitutionality of government actions.  The new chamber was created largely in
response to declining public opinion of the judiciary.  Sala IV soon became a popular avenue for
groups to challenge government action.  In fact, both the court’s popularity and its activism came as
a surprise to the government that had created it.  Ultimately, the court’s decisions seriously affected
– and frequently hindered – the government’s program of neo-liberal economic reforms.
85
Again, such a scenario seems extremely unlikely in the Chinese case.  But it is worth
considering, since the claim is often made that “rule of law” legal reforms and market economy
reforms are complements.  This may in fact be true.  But to the extent that law reform succeeds in
giving ordinary people the right to challenge central government decisions (and not merely the low-
level decisions of individual bureaucrats) it may make it more difficult for the government to adopt
difficult neo-liberal market reforms.  This may not be a bad thing, of course.
86  But it’s important
that reform advocates consider these potential consequences, especially if one subscribes to the
(controversial) hypothesis that political elites need a relatively high degree of autonomy to
implement painful reforms.
87
Thus, advocates of the Trojan Horse theory need to think their way out of a potential
dilemma.  If “rule of law” reforms don’t really lead to greater legal constraints on the central
government’s policy-making ability, the Trojan Horse strategy is flawed, or at least is sharply limited
in its potential.  But if legal constraints on central government discretion actually do become viable,
might this not interfere with Beijing’s ability to undertake other types of potentially painful – but
desirable – reforms?
The second issue to consider is the potential tension in institutional reform between
strengthening adjudicative independence and controlling official corruption.  Both of these goals
come up in discussions of areas where the Chinese legal system needs improvement, though the US
side tends to stress the former and the Chinese side emphasizes the latter.  To the extent that the US
side considers both important goals, though, we must consider the difficulties in achieving both of
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them together.  After all, the more adjudicators (be they judges or administrative officials) are
subject to political controls, the more likely it is that their decisions will be influenced by political
guidance than the application of supposedly impartial rules.  But the fewer controls placed on these
adjudicators, the greater the difficulty of insuring their accountability – and checking corruption.
Judge Clifford Wallace puts the point succinctly: “Although both judicial independence and judicial
accountability are vital for maintaining the rule of law, they sometimes seem to conflict.”
88  And a
main conclusion of Mauro Cappelletti’s comparative survey of judicial processes in Western
countries was the necessity of balancing the “conflicting values, independence and accountability.”
89
Both Wallace and Cappelletti conclude that independence and accountability are not
mutually exclusive, and that they can be balanced effectively given appropriate institutional choices.
But the potential conflict is real, and is something that China rule of law reform advocates ought to
consider more closely.  Furthermore, there are other institutional tensions as well.  Richard Messick
and Linn Hammergren, for example, suggest that mechanisms to ensure judicial accountability may
also create obstacles to judicial efficiency.
90  These analyses suggest that advocates of Chinese
institutional reform on both sides need to think more carefully about these sources of tension.  To
the extent that reformers are successful in pushing one goal of institutional reform, they may
undermine another.
A third issue is the possibility that there may be tensions not only at the level of institutional
arrangements, but at the level of fundamental rule-of-law values.  Consider, as one example, the
tension between the “rule of law” goals of predictability and equity.
91  Clear rules, systematically
applied, are the best way to ensure predictability.  But rules can never capture all the possible
variations in individual cases, and sometimes a mechanical application of the rules would lead to
results that seem grossly unfair.  Thus legal systems throughout history have tried to find ways to
balance predictability – decisions based on clear rules – with equity – making sure that individual
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91 These goals were expressed by a US State Department official. [Interview (A).]30
cases are decided in accordance with principles of fairness and justice, even when the formal rules
would dictate otherwise.
92
According to one source in the US government, American NGOs don’t see a tension
between promoting equity and predictability in the Chinese case.  The two values, it was argued, are
not inconsistent, and the Chinese system is currently in such a state that these sorts of questions
aren’t really relevant, at least not yet.
93  This official has a point.  If the current system is both
unpredictable and unfair, it may seem like academic hair-splitting to worry about philosophical
inconsistencies between the two goals.  Nevertheless, if the rule of law reform strategy is based on
the idea that principles adopted for one area of the legal system will spread, it is worth considering
the possible tension between different facets of the American rule-of-law vision.
A fourth and final concern is that US support for rule of law reform in China is ultimately
counterproductive for true systemic change in China, since these sorts of reforms merely help to
legitimize the authoritarian Chinese state.  This seems to be the view of many members of the US
Congress, and State Department officials and NGOs alike express their frustration over
congressmen who refuse to support any program that might be seen as helping the Chinese
government do anything.
94  But the association of this line of argument with members of Congress
who are perceived as narrow-minded and short-sighted may have blinded some to the kernel of
truth in the argument.  As one professor put it, “One doesn’t need to endorse Jesse Helms to
believe that the legitimation issues are real.”
95  After all, one of the reasons China would want to talk
openly about promoting the rule of law – albeit secondary to attracting foreign investment – is that
it may increase the regime’s legitimacy.  The extent to which it actually would, and whether the net
effects for eventual political reform would be positive or negative, is a question that has not been
explored systematically.  My personal view is that supporting rule of law programs would not
contribute substantially to the legitimacy of the Chinese leadership, but this opinion is not grounded
in any strong theory or evidence.  Once we dissociate the legitimation argument from some of its
more crude formulations and distasteful proponents, it becomes clear that it is an argument that
needs, at the very least, to be taken seriously.
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Summary and Conclusions
The United States government began advocating Chinese “rule of law” reform as an
extension of its human rights policy.  The US wants China to move in the direction of a substantive
vision of the rule of law, which, while not necessarily identical to the US system, protects certain
basic rights and preserves certain procedural standards.  However, the Chinese government has a
very different idea of what is meant by “rule of law”, and wants to limit legal reform to those areas
that are directly relevant for international economic integration and domestic market reforms.  This
creates obvious problems for US backers of a legal reform initiative conceived of as an extension of
US human rights policy.  Therefore, American rule-of-law advocates have adopted what I have
called a “Trojan Horse” strategy.  The belief is that limited law reforms will lead to more
fundamental changes in the Chinese legal and political system, which the Chinese central
government will not be able to control.
However, the mechanism by which this widespread change takes place is not specified
clearly.  Consideration of three of the possible mechanisms shows that each is problematic.  There is
not a good theoretical reason to believe that legal systems have a kind of fundamental unity of
principles and institutions, nor is there convincing empirical evidence that this is the case.  Attempts
to change China’s “legal culture” – the way people, especially legal professionals, think about law –
may not make much of an impact either.  Not only is it difficult to bring about such change, but
evidence suggests that the way people think about law itself is less important than social, economic,
and political structures.  The hope that limited legal reforms will stimulate growing public demand
for further reforms may also be misplaced, given that incremental reforms are often disruptive and
can generate anti-reform pressure.  Moreover, there appear to be tensions between the goals
espoused by rule-of-law reform advocates: legally-constrained government and decisive reform,
independence and accountability, predictability and equity.
These considerations suggest that policy-makers need to take a long, hard look at what they
hope to achieve by promoting “rule of law” in China, and how they hope to achieve it.  Again, I
must stress that this does not mean that the various legal reform programs advocated by the US
government and NGOs are bad ideas.  If the dangers inherent in these sorts of projects can be
avoided, and the initiatives are successful in improving the functioning of Chinese courts, helping
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China attract foreign investment and engage in world trade, controlling corruption, and reigning in
the discretion of the administrative bureaucracy, then they can be considered valuable and
worthwhile, even if they don’t have any broader effects.  I have not attempted to evaluate any of
these individual programs; my subjective impression is that many of them are doing important,
useful work.  What I want to question is the larger claim that these programs will help promote
some broader vision of the “rule of law” in China, and that they will lead to widespread reforms
even against the wishes of the current Chinese leadership.  “Rule of law” made its way onto the US
governmental agenda, at least in part, because of this belief.  But given the state of existing theory
and empirical evidence, this conviction seems unfounded.  I say “unfounded” rather than “false”
because we don’t have enough evidence to conclude that the Trojan Horse view is demonstrably
incorrect.  But given the weakness of the theory and evidence behind this element of US rule of law
rhetoric and strategy, and in light of the sad history of the first Law and Development Movement,
there is ample reason to think more rigorously and realistically about the means and ends of law
reform – and sooner, rather than later.33
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